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EDITORIAL
THE LAW SCHOOL
In law schools attended by students from many states, it may be found impracticable to teach the Anglo-American system of law as it is developed and administered in any one jurisdiction. Certainly the great majority of such law
schools do not attempt to do so.
Instead, however, of admitting that their failure to teach a realistic jurisprudence is due to its impracticability in the particular case, they disingenuously
insist that it is undesirable in any case.
It seems to be quite obvious that students who intend to practice in Pennsylvania, for instance, after learning that at common law contracts for the sale of
lands noed not be in, or be evidenced by, writing, and the requirements for such
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contracts prescribed by statutes of fraud of the orthodox type, should learn also
the intensely unique rules on this subject which exist in Pennsylvania as a result
of statute and decision, and that the law school should help students to learn
them. Certainly a student who has learned how equity was administered by the
High Court of Chancery, and how it is administered in the code states, but who is
unfamiliar with the Pennsylvania system of administering equity in common law
forms of action, is not adequately prepared to practice law in Pennsylvania.
These examples may be multiplied indefinitely.
In justification of their attempt to teach a jurisprudence in vacuo and not
as an operating mechanism for the promotion of the public welfare, the so-called
"national" law schools are wont to assert that if a student in law school is taught
the general principles of the common law concerning a certain subject and the
general trends of the statutory law relative thereto, he may learn without law
school instruction the idiosyncratic rules of his own jurisdiction. It is also true,
of course, that a law school student who has been thoroughly instructed in the
law of contracts can learn the peculiar rules of agency without law school instruction. Indeed, one who has received an adequate preliminary training can learn
any branch of the law without law school instruction. But the so-called "national"
law schools would probably be the last to admit that the law school training is
not highly desirable or that it should not include intensive instruction in specific
subjects.
Instruction should be given where it is most needed, and the need for it is
greater in regard to principles and rules which have not been discussed in scholarly
books by learned writers. The so-called local principles and rules of a particular
jurisdiction usually have not been so expounded.
The purpose of the Dickinson School of Law is to equip its students for
undertaking the practice of law. It therefore endeavors to familiarize them with
the law of the jurisdiction in which they intend to practice. In doing so it
requires that "the primary rules and fundamental principles therein developed
should be carefully weighed," and that- "when the first great sources have been
exploded, and the courses of the various streams discovered, they should be carefully pursued through their devious windings, marking well in the progress of the
derelictions and alluvions, islands and embankments, the depth and face of the current, how the waters have been appropriated, and the design of every change and
modification," for, "in this way only can a general map of the law be duly impressed
upon the mind in all its forces and with all its complicated delineations."
The Law School is thus true to its tradition, for when it was founded over
one hundred years ago its course of study consisted of "a minute inquiry into the
science of the law and the technical details involved in the practice of it," and such
a course of -study was prescribed by its illustrious founder because he knew that
because of "the inappropriate means furnished for their instruction students are
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frequently admitted to the bar who are altogether unacquainted with the laws
which they stand pledged to expound and profess to practice," who "are generally
better acquainted with the forms and technicalities of the King's Bench and the
High Court of Chancery in England than with those of the various courts of the
Commonwealth" and who are "unaware of the numerous and radical chahges
introduced into the law by our constitution and acts of assembly."
W. H. Hitchler

NOTES
JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY
THOSE STANDING IN FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIP
Prior to the Act of 1895, P. L. 54,1 it was held consistently that separate
actions had to be brought by a husband and wife for their respective damages
growing out of an injury to the wife. This practice of submitting the same issue
to two different juries often resulted in duplication of damages, to say nothing
of the multiplicity of suits. Ordinarily, the husband's suit was tried first. To
establish his injury and the extent of his deprivation of her services, the injury
and suffering of the wife were naturally part of the evidence. Such necessary
evidence often unconsciously influenced the husband's measure of damages.
Later, the wife would bring her action, and the jury would be carefully told that
her husband's verdict did not include any recovery for her. As a result, she
generally was granted a liberal amount by another and usually sympathetic jury.
This evil of duplication was real and substantial. 2 Again, juries were often passing upon the findings of other juries involving the claims of husband and wife.
For instance, .the jury in the husband's action would grant him damages, thus
finding the defendant negligent. Later, another jury in the wife's suit might
find that the defendant was not negligent or that the wife was contributorily
negligent. This latter finding in effect not only reflected upon the action of another jury but also irrevocably granted damages to the husband who may not
have been really deserving of them. Consequently, the Act of 1895 was enacted
to obviate these evils. For the same reasons, the Act of 1897, P. L. 623 was
passed also.
112 P. S. 1621.
2Donoghue v. Traction Co., 201 Pa. 181 (1901).
512 P. S. 1625.

